Bhutto, a documentary about Benazir Bhutto’s life, recently opened in the US to gushing reviews. The film sidesteps allegations of corruption, and instead revives the feminist mythology of the former prime minister`s first term. Interviewees describe her as the first female head of a Muslim state, the woman who succeeded despite the fact that her parents mourned her gender at her birth.online canadian pharmacy
The urge to celebrate Benazir`s successes as a woman is common, and seems to be catching. Desperate to bookend critiques of Pakistan with positivity, westerners and local analysts alike point to the country`s women as a source of hope. They emphasise that female students are the top scorers in university exams; that feisty, female anchors keep Pakistanis informed through nightly newscasts; that rural women sustain families with microfinance loans; and that the Supreme Court Bar Association is headed by a phenomenal female lawyer.

Paeans to Pakistani women also highlight how they accomplish against all odds. It is the Mukhtaran Mai model of feminism: after being gang-raped and dragged naked through the streets, she started her own school. And Benazir sought revenge by championing democracy. This recurring theme pits Pakistani women as capable of saving themselves, each other, and the country as a whole.

Too bad reality does not concur with these lofty narratives. The Federal Shariat Court`s declaration about the unconstitutional nature of some clauses of the Protection of Women Act (2006) is the latest blow to the struggling cause of women`s rights in Pakistan.

Through this judgment, the FSC is advocating for the Hudood Ordinance to be reinstated in its most brutal and unjust form: it has ruled on provisions that require female rape victims to produce four witnesses to support their claims, and entitle police to arrest women who report rape on charges of adultery. In other words, it appears the court would like to sanction the false convictions and wrongful imprisonment of victimised women.

Unfortunately, this is not the only setback to women`s rights in 2010. The year began with the death by the alleged torture of Shazia Masih, a young maid in the employ of a prominent lawyer. The case inspired urgent calls for the government to reintroduce the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Bill, which lapsed last year after the Senate failed to pass it. Months have gone by, and Pakistani women still await the bill`s second coming.

Tens of thousands of girls continued to be deprived of an education as the Taliban blew up dozens more schools, while the government showed little interest in rebuilding and securing the facilities. Atrocities such as honour killingsthrived under the guise of tradition, while mounting cases of rape, domestic violence and harassment remained beyond the purview of the law. All this, despite the fact that this summer`s flooding exposed the pitiable state of Pakistani women to the world. As the Indus breached its banks, we saw waves of malnourished, illiterate, poverty-stricken women, without so much as a national identity card to call their own.

Given the ongoing plight of Pakistani women, it is strange to think that just last year the nation`s attitude towards extremists was changed by televised images of a young woman from Swat being flogged. Overnight, people rallied to defend women against such brutalities. But back then, too, it would have been fallacious to think that security policy could be dictated by a genuine interest in safeguarding women`s rights. The fact is, women`s rights in Pakistan are a political tool that is wielded by various factions to manipulate an emotive public and further agendas that rarely have anything to do with women.

The Asian Human Rights Commission has already warned that religious parties will exploit the FSC ruling for political gain — expect a pro-Hudood campaign in the same vein as the ongoing pro-blasphemy law movement. Coinciding with the religious right`s machinations to wrest power from the ruling coalition, the judgment offers the perfect impetus to launch an anti-women platform, hog news headlines, and rouse conservative sentiment to drive future electoral gains.

Of course, all blame for the political manipulation of women`s issues does not lie with the right alone — the left is equally guilty. Consider the PPP, which uses the Benazir symbol to legitimise a corrupt and crumbling government. This is the same government that allowed Senator Israrullah Zehri to become a federal minister after he defended the alleged burying alive of five women in Balochistan as `tribal tradition.` It is also the same government that imposed the Sharia law in agreement with the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi in Swat last year, despite knowing the implications for women`s rights.

While warning against the `Talibanisation` of Karachi, the MQM too raised the cry of women`s rights. But as ethnic strife in the city has intensified, many have dismissed that as an attempt to stem demographic change along ethnic — and thus electoral — lines. Where were these political parties when the domestic violence bill lapsed? And what will they do now that the FSC has issued its ruling about the women`s protection act?

Nothing illustrates the fact women`s rights are a political ploy, rather than a genuine movement, more than Sharmila Farooqui`s recent response, as reported, to the alleged gang-rape of a young woman in Karachi. Rather than defend the victim`s privacy and legal right to prosecute, Farooqui revealed her identity to the media and expressed scepticism about her claims. One cannot say that a woman of Farooqui`s generation has been brainwashed by a patriarchal mindset; one can only assume, then, that she believed it was politically expedient to downplay allegations of rape, rather than use the opportunity to decry the injustices of the Hudood Ordinance.

In this environment, Pakistani women should not be fooled into thinking that their rights are secure or expanding. Isolated incidents such as Asma Jehangir`s SCBA victory are no indication of how far we`ve come. In truth, Pakistani women`s status is devolving, and that too in the name of a vibrant democracy. Rather than celebrate the exceptions, the international community should pressurise the government to prioritise women`s empowerment. The first step towards curing a problem is admitting that you have one.

There’s one thing the world is learning about Pakistan: this is a nation that likes binaries. Civil and military; Islam and secularism; dictatorships and democracies; China and the US; Sufi and Salafi. Whether it’s an ideology, a policy, or an alliance, if it’s double-edged, two-pronged, or Janus-faced, chances are we will have an affinity for it. It thus comes as no surprise that theories about why Pakistan is reluctant to pursue militant groups that enjoy safe havens within its border feature two culprits: India and Afghanistan.

WikiLeaks added a fresh spin to the India theory this week by revealing Indian perceptions of the Pakistan Army as “hypnotically obsessed” with its rival military. Indeed, the `strategic assets` argument about Pakistan`s patience for militant sanctuaries persists in many circles, despite the fact that militant groups have targeted about 300 ISI personnel and attacked several agency offices in the past two years. When US officials concede that the Pakistan Army is, to borrow a phrase from GHQ, stretched too thin, they are obliquely referring to this theory. Read between the lines: the army is stretched thin, despite having boosted its northwestern ranks to 140,000 troops, because the remainder of the active force continues to man the eastern border.

This theory, however, is less in vogue these days. Thanks to the findings of the Obama administration`s December review of the long war, there is more interest in the Afghanistan theory of Pakistani obstinacy regarding militant sanctuaries.

On this matter, the reigning wisdom in Washington is that Pakistan is reluctant to stir the hornet`s nest that is North Waziristan because it is counting on militant groups based there to serve its national interests during the tumult that will ensue from the gradual withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan between 2011 and 2014.

Time and again, Pakistan has complained about the previous consequences of the US decision to abandon the region. Islamabad has cunningly reminded Washington of its culpability in the fallout from the anti-Soviet `jihad`, and evoked the trauma and sense of betrayal resulting from the Pressler Amendment. The logic of Pakistan needing a back-up plan in the face of American inconsistency and unreliability has clearly resonated — that`s why the US has promised us a five-year, $7.5bn civilian aid package under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, as well as a five-year $2bn security assistance package. Repeated reassurances from both the State Department and Pentagon about the US`s long-term commitment to the region have also been forthcoming.

But as on most other matters, Pakistan is double-minded on this point too. Our fear that the US will leave the region abruptly is matched only by our fear that it will stay here indefinitely. This latter concern has manifest in complaints about US meddling in Pakistani politics as well as critiques of America`s obsession with Pakistan`s nuclear programme. More frequently, and more vociferously, such fears have been articulated as paranoia about fortress-like, proliferating US embassies; arrivals by the planeload of Blackwater agents; US military control of the PAF Shahbaz Base at Jacobabad during this summer`s floods, and more.

It is surprising that this example of Pakistani schizophrenia and contradictory thinking is not highlighted more often. Is the genuine fear that the US will make a rapid, backdoor exit from the region, leaving us to pick up the pieces? Or that it is here to stay for the foreseeable future? The answer to that question is vital in understanding the broader Pakistani approach towards militant groups. It is also one that gets at the heart of the conundrum that is Pakistan, and reveals more about our polity than it does about US foreign policy or international relations.

In his writings, Rai Shakil Akhtar draws a useful distinction between two Pakistani worldviews, which adds nuance to the usual civil-military duality. By Akhtar`s construction, these are exemplified by the `status quo group` and the `agents of change`. The former comprises the traditional feudal elite supported by religious and conservative forces; the latter includes the business elite, academics, and many sections of the media. Although Akhtar does not clarify where the military lies in his categorisation, I would venture that in the context of this discussion, it leans towards the latter group.

By considering our establishment through the lens of these two groups (again, the doubling), Pakistan`s inconsistent approach towards the parameters of US regional involvement becomes clear. The status quo group wants the US to leave — they do not want to vie for control against an external source that could disrupt the power and profits they enjoy as a result of unchallenged (and largely untaxed) land ownership.The agents of change, on the other hand, are cognisant of the benefits that can be wrought from a sustained involvement with the US: development projects, lucrative tariffs and trade deals, military modernisation, and, with Washington`s support, standing as a global player on the world stage with the power to influence multilateral decision-making.

Until Pakistan determines which group has, or deserves, more power, its demands on both internal and external issues will never be respected by the international community — how can they be, if they are constantly being challenged and undermined by the competing group? In the same way that the world is befuddled by Pakistan`s unwillingness to crack down against Fata-based militants and sanctuary-seeking Afghan Taliban, the international response to our security and other policies will continue to be confused, critical and contrary.

For that reason, the Pakistani public should demand coherence from the establishment. The need of the hour is a single voice espousing a single vision that promotes the country`s best interests. Given the latest break-up and makeup shenanigans of our political parties, however, it seems that urgent need will remain unmet for many years to come.

Not content with shaming US diplomats, the Pakistani press this week, under the cover of the WikiLeaks scandal, dragged Indians into the mire too.

News reports, which have since been retracted, cited fake leaked cables in which US diplomats described senior members of India`s military as egotistical, geeky, and even genocidal, while Indian politicians were accused of maintaining ties with Hindu fundamentalists. The propagandistic use of the `leaked cables` occurred at the expense of the local media`s credibility, but in the publication of these false reports lies a vital reminder about Pakistani foreign policy.

Notably, reports about the fake cables were sourced to an Islamabad-based news agency that has been described in the international media as having close links to the Pakistani intelligence services. Writing in the Guardian , Declan Walsh rightly pointed out that the readiness of news organisations to publish the false reports without verifying their content indicates the Pakistan Army`s continued influence over the supposedly free media landscape.

The fact that America`s lowest moment in public diplomacy and international perception can be reoriented as a critique about India in the Pakistani public sphere is telling. The incident reiterates what the WikiLeaks made clear, and what we all already knew even before the document dump: the country`s foreign policy — and the national conversation about it — is being carefully micromanaged by the army.

Few will have missed the fact that in addition to disparaging remarks, the fake anti-India cables are peppered with praise by US generals for Pakistani generals, implying a close, trusting relationship (which, ironically, the real WikiLeaks cables about nukes and ongoing military ties to terrorist groups made clear is severely strained).

This added flourish can only be understood as an attempt at damage control in the aftermath of the WikiLeaks during which Pakistan`s relationship with the US has been widely panned — terms deployed to describe our country include `lackey`, `client`, `stooge`, `banana republic`, `colony, `satrapy`, `puppet`, and those are the ones I can put in print. The reasons the security forces would want to mend the public perception of this relationship, and try and deflect some negativity across the eastern border, are known.

The Pakistan Army perpetuates the foreign policy narrative about the abiding threat next door, which is balanced by strategic ties elsewhere abroad for the advancement of its own interests. As an institution, the army prioritises modernisation, weapons procurement, and access to cutting-edge technology and training.

It remains invested in foreign policy issues because connections with western states are seen as a way for the army to fulfil these institutional goals. In the case of the Pakistan, as in other poorly governed countries where the military is entrusted with state survival, the army`s institutional imperatives outweigh the demands of democracy, diplomacy, multilateralism and public participation. In the coming years, one can expect to see more heavy-handedness on the part of the security forces in response to regional military developments. The fact is, Pakistan finds itself in the most rapidly militarising neighbourhood of the world.

In 2010, Chinese year-on-year defence spending has risen 7.5 per cent; meanwhile, India`s defence allocation has grown by almost four per cent. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China was the largest arms buyer over the five-year period from 2005-2009, importing nine per cent of the world`s total; in the same period, India came in second with seven per cent of the global arms import.

China currently has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile programme, and is heavily investing in anti-satellite weapons and surveillance technologies, and boosting its cyber-attack capabilities. Working on the premise that the Indian Ocean is the Silk Road of the 21st century, China is also seeking to transform its navy from a `green water` to `blue water` force in an effort to secure maritime routes. The People`s Liberation Army Navy has therefore invested in stealth submarines, anti-ship missiles and conventional warships.

For its part, India`s military modernisation plan comprises a $100bn allocation for weapons procurement over 10 to 20 years. This includes $11bn for a 126-unit medium, multi-role aircraft competition and $12bn to expand the Indian navy to 160 ships by 2022 in an effort to balance China`s increased naval presence.

US responses to China`s rising military might are expected to add further impetus to India`s military modernisation plan (consider India`s purchase of 10 cargo planes during President Barack Obama`s visit to New Delhi in November). This plan faces a variety of problems, including corruption, entangled procurement protocols and a lack of vision and coordination so endemic that the Brookings Institution`s Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta have described it as “arming without aiming”. But no matter.

In an effort to balance the Indian Army`s weapons procurement and growth, the Pakistan Army will seek to pursue and legitimise those foreign policies that yield the best real returns (read arms deals). The past week`s fake cables saga heralds what shape that legitimisation process might take.

And so it is that regional military developments will exacerbate Pakistan`s domestic political turmoil. As the Pakistan Army`s need to access to more weapons, technology, and training becomes urgent, the civil-military power struggle for control over politics, policymaking, and the public sphere`s perception of these matters will intensify. The army knows that its institutional development depends on its foreign policy credentials and its political capacity to emerge as a guarantor of regional diplomacy.

Instead of the secretive diplomacy embodied in the real WikiLeaks, or the manipulative politicking of the fake leaked cables, Pakistan deserves a channel for public diplomacy to transparently pick through these issues. Our nation`s governance, civil society and free press cannot be held hostage by regional militarisation trends.

Whatever one thinks of Julian Assange, the principles behind his WikiLeaks website are among those that Pakistani civil society has been advocating for: transparency, government accountability, increased access to information and public participation in the political decision-making process.

online canadian pharmacy However, barely days after Cablegate, rather than addressing revelations about Pakistani governance and foreign relations, the establishment is doing what it can to suppress the impact of the leaks. It seems as if this diplomatic fiasco is fated to be yet another missed opportunity for Pakistan to evaluate its leadership structure, engage productively with its ambivalent allies and convey its legitimate national interests to the international community.

Although last week`s leaks emphasise the divisiveness between the government, army, opposition and foreign powers, the reaction to WikiLeaks’ revelations has been uniform. The prime minister has dismissed them as mischief, and the US ambassador has described them as malicious. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet neglected to mention the disclosures in its official press release, stating that it had `more important` things to discuss, even though sources have confirmed the matter was addressed on Friday.

Taking it a step further, the defence minister has written off the leaks as an attempt to demoralise the armed forces, while the Sindh home minister has denounced the website`s revelations as lies. The Lahore High Court also received a petition seeking to ban the WikiLeaks website on the basis that it is a conspiracy to cleave the Muslim world.

One would think that the WikiLeaks releases— which document the extent of the civil-military power struggle, reveal our politicians as mere pawns of foreign governments, raise questions about the security of our nuclear programme, and much more — would prompt clarifications and apologies from our leaders. But the official responses thus far betray a worrying instinct to reject and repudiate that which is problematic. Rather than shatter the status quo, the leaks have strengthened it — concerned officials are now scrambling to deny rather than deal with the issues that have been thrown up by the disclosures, thereby exacerbating existing tensions.

Only Justice Azmat Saeed, the LHC judge who dismissed the petition calling for the WikiLeaks website ban, seems to have got it right. He argued that the website had to remain accessible to honour the public`s right to information, adding that nothing is greater than the truth. He also astutely noted that little revealed about Pakistan`s military or politics has not already been broadcast by the local media.

Indeed, blogger Peter Beinart`s point that the WikiLeaks offer “valuable insights” only if “you`ve been living under a rock all century” is particularly applicable to Pakistan. Our government was in on the drone attacks? US special operations forces have been on the ground, hunting Al Qaeda militants? None of this comes as a surprise. That, however, is not the point.

The leaked US diplomatic cables have brought off-the-record content into public political discourse. As such, they offer Pakistan the opportunity to rescue foreign relations from the realm of conspiracy theory, and bring international relations into accordance with public expectations. In the context of strained US-Pakistan relations, WikiLeaks could help jumpstart a frank discussion that aims to balance Pakistan`s national interests with America`s security imperatives; the disclosures could form the basis of plain-speaking engagement that both sides have been requesting since the start of the strategic dialogue.

Many disclosures support the Pakistani argument that its interests are regularly overridden by the US, which has the tendency to see it as nothing more than a gun for hire. For instance, cables confirm Afghan support for Brahamdagh Bugti, reveal that the US is not fully committed to negotiating with the Afghan Taliban, and describe America`s lack of confidence in the Afghan government. These leaks give impetus to Pakistan`s repeated demands for a role in any Afghanistan solution.

Similarly, the cables show that Pakistani paranoia about nuclear arsenal being seized is not entirely unfounded, as several governments have expressed concerns about nuclear terrorism resulting from a security lapse. Post-WikiLeaks, behind-the-scenes bickering about this issue can be aired at a multilateral forum where Pakistan can debate safeguards in line with international standards.

The US, meanwhile, can openly press Pakistan on issues such as continued establishment ties to militant organisations, the misallocation of US funding for the Pakistan Army and Pakistan`s disproportionate concerns about the Indian Army`s Cold Start doctrine (which the cables describe as a “mixture of myth and reality”).

Such unpopular matters can only be tackled if Pakistan is offered concessions on issues that it sees are vital to its national interests. Overall, the facts that have been brought on to public record as a result of the WikiLeaks provide the basis for compromises and negotiations — the stuff of productive diplomacy, which goes beyond `transactional` engagements — between Pakistan and the US.

More importantly, fact-based dialogue between Pakistan and the US, rather than the musings of media personnel or misquotes of ministers, can encourage the Pakistani public`s participation in the foreign policy debate. Now that bilateral issues are out on the table, Pakistanis themselves should demand the accountability from their leadership that until now has only been extended to foreign diplomats.

For example, the security of Pakistan`s nuclear arsenal is of equal concern for Pakistanis and the international community. Armed with knowledge about the world`s concerns, we should ourselves ask questions about the threat of nuclear terrorism that foreign governments have been pursuing behind closed doors. Sadly, any productive fallout from the WikiLeaks` scandal has already been curtailed by the establishment`s comprehensive policy of denial.

As Nato and US deadlines for withdrawal from Afghanistan have become clearer, our establishment has put its savvy on fine display. Pakistan has re-articulated its long-held geo-strategic goals in the context of the fight against extremism, thereby ensuring that the international community accommodates the country’s foreign policy priorities.

It now seems that a friendly government in Kabul and pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute are imperatives for Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy. But take a closer look and it becomes apparent that the government has yet to show any real commitment to eliminating extremism.

With regard to close Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in a post-US withdrawal scenario, a counter-terrorism case is easily made: with Kabul’s cooperation, Islamabad can better monitor terrorist activity along the Durand Line and ensure that anti-Pakistan militant groups do not find sanctuary in Afghanistan.

In the event of civil war, an Islamabad that enjoys influence in Kabul would be well positioned to stem the inevitable tide of refugees that would further destabilise Pakistan. Moreover, Islamabad, or Rawalpindi, can check Indian support for Afghanistan-based, anti-Pakistan separatist or militant groups with Kabul’s support.

By making the country’s future stability contingent on its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan has earned the ear of the international community. A recent report issued by the Pentagon calls for balancing Pakistani and Indian interests in Afghanistan. Kashmir, too, has been brought to the forefront of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy. During October’s US-Pakistan strategic dialogue, the foreign minister reiterated the resonance of the Kashmir issue with the Pakistani public. And in recent visits to Washington, retired generals Ehsanul Haq and Pervez Musharraf stated that resolving the dispute is necessary for reducing Pakistani terrorism since ongoing injustices in Kashmir spur militant recruitment.

These arguments have improved Pakistan’s counter-terrorism credentials on the world stage by showing that our leaders are attuned to the multifaceted threat and committed to fighting terrorism in a holistic way. But while an emphasis on Afghanistan and Kashmir furthers military interests and advances the foreign policy agenda, it does not get at the heart of the problem of proliferating extremism, which is primarily societal, and must be addressed through social policy and improved governance. In this approach, the Pakistani establishment is failing miserably in its fight against extremism.

This failure is encapsulated by the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (Nacta), which has been plagued by bureaucratic tussles and personnel issues since its inception, and remains dysfunctional. The authority was well conceived with a mandate to coordinate counter-terrorism initiatives with an eye to short-, medium- and long-term goals. But the authority’s inability to design an all-encompassing strategy is apparent in the many vital gaps that remain in Pakistan’s efforts to contain extremism.

One of the widest gaps endures in the form of Pakistan’s dismal education sector. One-third of primary age children are not in school, causing Pakistan to rank 163rd out of 177 countries on the UN index of education systems. It is well known that literacy and the employment opportunities it engenders are the best antidote to militant recruitment. But our government has reneged on a commitment to increase education expenditure to four per cent of the GDP (the current level of under two per cent is unacceptably low).

Moreover, civil society has been calling for curriculum reform to curtail the circulation of intolerant and divisive viewpoints currently enshrined in national textbooks. On this point, Sir Michael Barber, co-chair of the government-mandated Pakistan Education Task Force, recently acknowledged that institutional emphasis remains on promoting primary education since any push to re-evaluate the curriculum’s ideological positioning could stall the entire process.

The government has also made little headway in its efforts to change the climate of xenophobia and intolerance in Pakistani society. No doubt, the right noises have been made: Zardari’s government is the first to appoint a minister for minorities; it also established the Sufi Advisory Council and the Sindh Education Department is now launching an International University of Sufism at Bhitshah. But all this signifies little in real terms.

The recent appointment of Mohammad Khan Sheerani as the chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology is a case in point. The controversial choice of a conservative cleric with party affiliations (despite the CII’s charter of non-partisanship) may be politically expedient, but it is regressive in terms of the fight against extremism. Sheerani’s appointment will certainly embolden religious-political parties and, more problematically, make policymaking and parliamentary decrees beholden to the ideological frameworks of religious, rather than progressive, forces.

The government’s handling of Aasia Bibi’s case has also shown its wavering commitment to creating an environment in which Pakistanis can tackle sensitive religious and social issues without fearing an extremist backlash.

From the outset, the government insisted that it would be impossible to repeal the heinous blasphemy laws on the basis of Aasia’s case. The logic behind this conclusion was that scrapping the legislation could provoke extremists and fuel militancy. In other words, instead of changing flawed legislature to outlaw intolerance, the government has handled the case so as not to offend extremist sensibilities. It is telling that rather than appease the extremists, this tactic has only encouraged them: the Sunni Ittehad Council on Friday threatened ‘anarchy’ if Aasia received a presidential pardon.

Since the extremists seized Swat, civil society activists have been urging the Pakistani establishment to sincerely address the growing radicalism. But that call goes unheeded, and each missed opportunity, such as the few outlined above, brings society closer to the brink.

Until now, the establishment has cited the extremist threat only to increase its clout on the international stage, milk the US for more dollars, and bulldoze through foreign policy agendas. What will it take for the powers that be to acknowledge extremism as an existential threat?

RECENTLY, writer and scholar Reza Aslan stopped off in Washington to promote online canadian pharmacy, an anthology of 20th-century writings in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu that articulate the experience of colonialism. When asked by an audience member why he had chosen to edit such a volume at this juncture, Aslan responded, “there is only one way for us to get to know each other, and that is through the arts”. Indeed, the anthology is being seen as a powerful antidote to the Islamophobia that currently subsumes America. Popular, satirical TV show host Steve Colbert branded the volume an `art-ument` that can help reframe US perceptions of the Muslim world.

Aslan is on to something. Art has long been lauded for humanising that which politics and war demonise. In this confrontational world where civilisations clash and great powers plot, art in all its forms can help counteract the politics of hate and fear. Art complicates the one-dimensional narratives on which politicians, generals and extremists thrive in order to perpetuate conflict.

It was this power of art that provoked Raj Thackeray, the leader of the India`s right-wing Maharashtra Navnirman Sena party, to ban the works of Pakistani writers in the immediate wake of the Mumbai attacks. To craft an effective political response to those horrifying attacks, Thackeray needed to make those 15 terrorists interchangeable with the Pakistani nation as a whole; he needed, in the words of Neel Mukherjee, to create a “terrifying Other”.

In his actions, Thackeray resembled legions of Pakistani and Indian government officials who have banned films and TV channels from across the border at the first sign of dissent. Such censorship pays testament to the fact that art prevents false constructs. With its regard for nuance and subtlety, art hinders the processes of political obfuscation.

The time has come for Pakistanis to embrace art. As political turmoil escalates, art can provide an opportunity for reflection. The 24-7 news cycle throws up tidbits for audiences to gorge on endlessly, but the parts never amount to a satisfying whole. Works of art, on the other hand, are necessarily coherent and complete — by painting a bigger picture, they restore hope where there is only despair.

Art has also proved to be the greatest defence against ignorance. Few people will voluntarily pick up a textbook on a subject they are unfamiliar with; many will read a novel or watch a show. Moreover, freed from academic constraints, art can negotiate between past, present and future, transcend disciplines and juxtapose ideas. That`s why the rock band Laal has successfully used music to introduce a new generation to old poetry.

Against all odds, Pakistan`s contemporary artists have made their voice heard in international discourse. As they did under colonial rule and dictatorial regimes, our writers, poets, playwrights and painters have responded to the horror of the times with beauty and dignity. Hanging Fire Slackistan Granta 112

Whilst abroad, I have often found that the only thing that interrupts conversations about Pakistan`s dubious role in the fight against terrorism is mention of , last year`s exhibition of contemporary art, , a new film about Islamabad`s elite youth, or , a collection of essays, articles, and stories about Pakistan.

These tastes of contemporary Pakistani culture are creating an international appetite for an alternate narrative about our country. In time, our art might release us from the representational trap laid by the international news media, with its intent narrative about Pakistan as the most dangerous country on earth.

There are many ways in which the Pakistan government can support what up to now has been an accidental trend: channel aid towards art institutes; offer residencies; develop studio spaces and performance venues. The establishment can also ensure security for artists and their works.

I advocate for such support even in the face of insurmountable challenges posed by the nationwide militant threat and this summer`s flooding. In spite of — or, more accurately, because of — Pakistan`s mounting economic woes, water scarcity, food insecurity and rampant illiteracy, it should make state support for the arts a policy priority.

Now more than ever, Pakistan needs an `art-ument` to help defend its national interests, sovereignty and polity. Nato`s 2014 Afghanistan withdrawal deadline has increased pressure on Pakistan to crack down on militancy. Last month, Bob Woodward revealed that the US has identified 150 Pakistani targets to strike in the event of a successful terrorist attack abroad. This month, a Council on Foreign Relations report has recommended unilateral action against the Lashkar-i-Taiba in the event of continued Pakistani inaction. All the while, drones kill and wound civilians.

No doubt, Pakistan must take a decisive stance against militancy. But counter-terrorism policies must keep the best interests of the Pakistani public in mind. The international community should not consider options of unilateral strikes lightly — these decisions must be taken with a deep understanding of who they will affect and how they will impact security and society. That extra consideration for Pakistanis cannot be instilled through drab policy reports; it can perhaps be inspired through the nation`s art.

Until Pakistanis are seen as humans who feel and fear, outsiders will not cultivate a regard for their best interests. We should therefore empower our artists to succeed where politicians and generals have failed. Their sensibilities can remind us that despite our differences we comprise a unified entity that stands to gain or lose equally from international policy decisions regarding Pakistan. And their creations can help the international community interpret us in a way that adds sensitivity to policy initiatives. As such, art could be Pakistan`s most effective form of public diplomacy.

Thursday’s attack on the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) office in Karachi will be remembered both for its horror and audacity. The toll of the blast was horrible: it claimed a number of lives, including that of a nine-year-old girl, and injured dozens among Karachi`s anonymous masses who live and work in the adjoining slum areas.

Its motive, on the other hand, was audacious: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) militants were apparently exacting revenge for the arrest of six of their ranks earlier in the week. One can assume the coordinated strikes were meant as a warning for the local administration — an attempt to dictate the terms of engagement between law-enforcers and lawbreakers. This audacity should be cause for significant concern.

Although Thursday`s attack is seen as the first of its kind against a state target in Karachi, it was by no means unexpected. The perception in recent years that the commercial capital had somehow been spared the violence that has ravaged the northern and western parts of the country was, after all, a phantasm.

Militants of all shapes, sizes, and sects have maintained a presence in the city since the early 1990s. And Karachi`s complicity in Pakistan`s national struggle against terrorism has been obvious for the better part of this decade, from Daniel Pearl`s murder and the arrest of Ramzi bin al Shibh in 2002 to the coordination of the Mumbai attacks and the recruitment of Faisal Shahzad in recent years. It was only a matter of time before the simmer came to a boil.

Despite being the target of this attack, Karachi`s law-enforcers have already been pilloried for unpreparedness and poor coordination. And the critiques are justified: high-profile LJ militants should not have been kept in a facility without maximum security. But these lapses should not be misinterpreted, since Karachi`s security officials are aware of the threat posed by local militants.

Indeed, they have made a concerted effort in this regard. In May 2009, CID officials arrested LJ member Qari Anwar and his gang in Model Colony. Late last year, 450 illegal immigrants, primarily Afghan and Uzbek nationals, were arrested for ties to militant groups. This year, dozens of Taliban militants have also been apprehended: most famously, Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader; most recently, Pakistan Taliban commander Qari Yousuf from Orangi Town earlier this month. The simple fact that the CID was targeted by militants this week indicates that they`re doing something right.

But something is going terribly wrong, too. Primarily, Karachi`s law-enforcers have allowed their approach to militancy to be swayed by an international narrative about Pakistan`s security. According to that narrative, the Pakistani state and its people are under attack by the Taliban, and that attack comes in the form of suicide bombings. In the absence of these elements, Karachiites have been fooled into thinking they`re safe, and those tasked with protecting the city have become complacent.

In innumerable news stories, as well as in a CID report from May this year, high-ranking police officials have emphasised that Karachi is a logistical and organisational hub for militancy, a place where militants from various groups come to rest, regroup and raise funds, rather than launch full-scale attacks. The few Taliban present in the city, they say, are `fixers` doing what amounts to running errands for their organisation.

Law-enforcers also repeat that militant groups in Karachi are involved in criminal activities — bank robberies, kidnappings for ransom, arms smuggling, drug trafficking — the proceeds of which are used to facilitate the so-called jihad being fought along faraway frontlines in Fata. The message, in other words, has been that Karachi`s militants are not coherently organised, and their activities and associations occur in small, palatable doses (as if criminality, albeit a lesser evil than suicide attacks, can ever be sanctioned).

By issuing reports and articulating militant dynamics, law-enforcers gave (and probably internalised) the impression of having the situation mapped, monitored and managed. But where there is smoke, there is bound to be fire — or firing and bomb blasts, as was the case at the CID office on Thursday. Any lingering complacency and illusion of control probably crumbled to the ground along with the CID building on Thursday.

Where do we go from here? CID SSP Omar Shahid has stated that there are up to 300 trained LJ fighters operating in Karachi. In previous news reports, CID officials have estimated that there are up to 5,000 people who have received some degree of militant training present in the city.

These militants reside in the densest parts of the city, where police surveillance is almost impossible. They work in groups of two or three people who associate briefly for the purposes of an attack or criminal activity and then disperse into the concrete jungle that is Karachi. Their activities are facilitated by many of the city`s 3,000 seminaries, which provide access to militant networks, ideological reaffirmation and financial resources. And it is becoming increasingly clear that they are willing to bring the fight to Karachi.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik loves to say that destabilising Karachi is akin to destabilising Pakistan. In the wake of this summer`s floods, a stable and secure Karachi is essential to jumpstart the economy. Unfortunately, while militants have been plotting how to attack Karachi, law-enforcers have been listing reasons why militants probably won`t attack their ultimate safe haven within Pakistan.

Now, more than ever, Karachi`s security officials must articulate plans for countering the militant menace that has been proliferating for two decades. The stand-off between the military and militants at Islamabad`s Lal Masjid in 2007 taught the country that no counter-terrorism activity is possible without a well-conceived plan.

In their many reports and media interviews, Karachi`s law-enforcers have not suggested how they might tackle the terror threat within the city`s intricate and infinite terrain (into which some LJ attackers may have escaped on Thursday). It is high time they addressed that most vital question.

The ongoing fight against militancy along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has been hijacked by charged rhetoric, conspiracy theories and competing interests. Consume enough media, and it begins to seem like the great game that many say it is — a blame game, a game of chance, a guessing game.

But far too frequently one is reminded of the very real consequences and immense human toll of this twisted `game`. Friday`s attacks in Darra Adamkhel and outside Peshawar were the most recent reminders in this vein.

Scores, including children, were killed, in the suicide bombing at the Friday prayers in Akhorwal. A few hours later, three more people died when grenades were flung at another mosque in Badhber.

In light of these horrifying attacks, it is ironic that the big counter-terrorism news of the week was the Obama administration`s announcement of stronger sanctions against the anti-India militant groups Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammad. On Friday, one was left wondering where the Zardari administration`s announcements about crackdowns against anti-Pakistan groups were.The sanctions were carefully timed: in the run-up to US President Barack Obama`s trip to New Delhi, they were meant to reassure India that Washington was not undermining its interests in deference to Pakistan. Given their diplomatic cachet, it is notable that the sanctions target terror financing. The US Treasury has put a freeze on Lashkar and Jaish assets and banned transactions with the groups as well as their operational fronts, such as the Al Rehman Trust. It has also prevented senior militant leaders such as Azam Cheema, Masood Azhar and Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki from using financial institutions. Makki, in particular, has been targeted for his role in raising funds for the Lashkar-i-Taiba.

As a goodwill gesture to India, the US crackdown on terror financing is significant. After all, cut the funding and terrorist activities will inevitably decline. In the world of terror, money is needed not only to secure materials for attacks, but also to travel, pay militants, provide for their families, recruit and train new fighters, propagate the ideology and bribe government officials. As Pakistan`s security situation further deteriorates, Islamabad should make its own call to disrupt the funding mechanisms of all militant groups active within its borders, not only those that plot against India.

To be fair, Pakistan has made efforts in this regard, as towards anti-money laundering legislation declaring terror financing to be a criminal offence. And in September this year, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan directed stock exchanges and more than 600 financial companies to implement anti-terror financing measures outlined by the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Progress is already visible as the amount of remittances being channelled through banks rather than the informal system has more than quadrupled since 2001.

But the push to combat terror financing is coming from abroad, not Islamabad. Pakistan`s efforts have largely resulted from arm-twisting by the US Treasury Department`s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and best financial practice recommendations are coming from the FATF. Without domestic political will, funds will continue to flow into the coffers of terrorists who target innocent Pakistanis as brutally as foreign troops in Afghanistan.

Instead of waiting for directives from Washington, Islamabad should devise its own strategy to minimise illicit finance. For example, the government can work towards licensing hawalas and other informal financial networks. In conjunction with the telecom sector, the government should also promote mobile banking as that reduces the prevalence of cash transactions and, consequently, the opportunities for illegal funds transfers.

The government should also convene monitoring committees to oversee the finances of Islamic charities known to serve as fronts for terrorist organisations, particularly in the case of donations received from the Gulf region. Moreover, the State Bank can be empowered to revitalise its financial intelligence unit, and law-enforcers should be trained to conduct financial investigations.

A well-coordinated crackdown on terror financing will also curtail a variety of criminal activity, especially in Pakistan`s cities. Terror groups are known to draw on funds generated through drug trafficking, arms smuggling, bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom and even credit card fraud. By following the money trail, law-enforcers can identify and break up urban criminal rings that are affiliated with Fata-based militant groups.

Of course, the onus to impede terror financing does not lie with the government alone. Taking a page from their counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan`s leading clerics can also speak out against illicit finance. The now-famous fatwa issued in May this year by the distinguished Saudi Council of Senior Ulema emphasised that financing terror is a form of complicity in the most heinous terrorist acts such as suicide bombings. Indeed, the kingdom`s religious leadership stated in no uncertain terms that Sharia law forbids terror financing, and went so far as to say that the financier is more dangerous than the terrorist because he enables wrongdoing. A similar ruling by Pakistani clerics could discourage those looking to wage `financial jihad` rather than `frontline jihad`.

The media too can play a role. Since millions of dollars to fund terrorist activities are generated through misguided donations to charities that serve as fronts, the media can run public advocacy campaign reminding philanthropists to double check the credentials of organisations they support.

Ultimately, without a sincere governmental effort to incapacitate terror financing networks, attacks such as those that occurred on Friday will continue within Pakistan, game or no game.

A few days after this summer’s flooding in Pakistan had gained momentum the phone calls began. The waters from the inundated valleys of the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province were now rushing towards the fertile plains of the Punjab. Foreign correspondents of several international news outlets based in Islamabad wanted to know how the flooding would impact counterterrorism efforts in the region. Would extremist organizations use the floods as an opportunity to infiltrate Pakistan’s rural areas? Would their religious rhetoric help give meaning to the calamity, thereby spurring recruitment among the rural poor?

I fumbled through answers to these questions, all the while transfixed by the disaster movie images on my television screen, and the soaring statistics about the number of people affected. In many exchanges with journalists, both domestic and foreign, I debated the risk posed by extremist groups who might try to exploit feelings of frustration and helplessness that would abound in flood-affected communities. But those discussions were half-hearted and distracted—I was more preoccupied by the humanitarian toll of the flooding than its impact on counterterrorism strategy.online canadian pharmacy

What those early phone calls made clear, however, was that the narrative about Pakistan’s floods was being hijacked. Instead of being framed as the worst humanitarian disaster on record, which is how U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described it, the flooding was being seen as another complication in the U.S.-led fight against Taliban insurgents and affiliated militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The consequences of this hijacking quickly became apparent. Despite the overwhelming scale of the disaster – 20 million people affected; five million homes damaged; 5,000 miles of roads washed away; 7,000 schools; and 400 health facilities destroyed – the international community proved reluctant to donate funds for flood-affected Pakistanis.

This reluctance is best illustrated by way of comparison with donations made to Haiti in the wake of the devastating earthquake barely six months earlier in January 2010. According to a report published by the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, two weeks after the first U.N. flash aid appeal in both disasters had been launched, pledges for Haiti covered 82 percent of the required amount while pledges for Pakistan only covered 57 percent. The contrast becomes starker when considered in terms of contributions per affected person: $157.16 USD per person in Haiti, and only $15.24 USD per person in Pakistan, a ten-fold difference. Despite the fact that Ban Ki-moon reiterated, “Waves of flood must be met with waves of support from the world,” Pakistan had to make do with a mere dribble.

The reasons for such an underwhelming response are multifaceted. Rising flood waters that wreak havoc over weeks do not inspire the same sense of urgency as earthquakes or tsunamis that raze cities and kill thousands in seconds. The mercifully low death toll during the floods also made it difficult for the international community to comprehend the true scale of the disaster. It did not help matters that diaspora Pakistanis were slow to mobilize in their countries of residence, particularly the U.S.

But the global hesitancy to donate to Pakistan can be traced back to the phone calls I received in July. The widely held perception of Pakistan as a corrupt, failing nation that harbors terrorists and nurtures extremist groups prevented many from mustering enough sympathy to make a donation. As Elizabeth Byrs, the spokeswoman for the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs conceded in mid-August, “We note often an image deficit with regards to Pakistan among Western public opinion.”

Notably, this “image deficit” was at its greatest in the run-up to the floods. A CNN poll in June indicated that 78 per cent of Americans hold “mostly unfavorable views of Pakistan.” Moreover, days before the U.N. announced its first flash appeal, British Prime Minister David Cameron, while on a visit to India, described Pakistan as a nation that exports and promotes terrorism. His comments, and the media furor they sparked, clouded perceptions of Pakistan even as waters breached the banks of the Indus and Swat rivers in the country’s northwest.

These perceptions were fueled by early news reports that members of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the humanitarian wing of Lashkar-e-Taiba (the militant group held responsible for the Mumbai attacks of 2008), were providing flood relief in several Pakistani villages. Since media coverage of the flooding was scant on the whole, such reports gave disproportionate importance to the terror aspect of the natural disaster at the expense of humanitarian reportage.online canadian pharmacy

According to Brookings Institution researchers Rebecca Winthrop and Justin van Fleet, media coverage of the floods in the U.S. was significantly less than that of the Haitian earthquake. Within 10 days of the earthquake, over 3,000 stories had appeared in the print and broadcast media; 10 days after Pakistan’s flooding peaked, there were about 1,000 stories in circulation.

Another study conducted at Northwestern University backs up these findings, and shows how concerns about terrorism dominated flood reportage. For example, in the two weeks following the Haitian earthquake, online canadian pharmacy published 88 articles on the topic, while it published only 15 about Pakistan’s floods in the same time frame. Of these, only one story made it to the front page—a piece analyzing “hard-line Islam” in a flood-hit Pakistan.

The Pakistani media – a vibrant, independent industry comprising dozens of print publications and television channels – did not fare much better. Days after the rains began, domestic outlets were more focused on negative coverage of Pakistani politicians’ response to the flooding.

President Asif Ali Zardari was widely critiqued for continuing with a scheduled trip to Europe while the floods raged. Riding the wave of populist ire, local television channels spent hours each day covering what they dubbed Zardari’s “joy ride,” a trip that included a helicopter ride to his family’s sixteenth-century chateau in Normandy, France. On the day that Zardari faced protests by long-time supporters in Birmingham, England, and even had a shoe thrown at him, there was barely any mention of the flooding on Pakistani airwaves. Three months later, one is hard-pressed to find coverage on the aftermath of the flooding in the local press.

Overall, the skewed media coverage has eclipsed an important statistic: 70 percent of the 20 million Pakistanis affected by the floods are women and children. These demographic groups are not the targets of extremist organizations looking to increase their ranks, nor are they corrupt politicians abdicating their responsibilities while the nation drowns. They are simply victims of a devastating natural disaster.

Half a million women caught by the flooding will give birth before February next year, and according to the World Health Organization, 32,000 will experience complications. Doctors Without Borders reports that the number of C-sections performed has already doubled owing to the poor conditions in which flood-affected women are living—without privacy, access to a toilet, or a change of clothes. Many women who have successfully delivered since being displaced are too weak to breastfeed, leaving their infants at risk of waterborne diseases and chronic malnutrition.

The fact that the international community has expressed fears about the increased post-flood security risk, but is less aware of the plight of the most vulnerable flood victims reflects a failure of the global media industry as well as the Pakistan government’s public diplomacy efforts.

It is not too late to rewrite the flood narrative, however. $9.7 billion USD is needed to repair the infrastructure damage caused by the floods, and seven million people remain without shelter. It is high time that journalists, and members of the international community at large, place a new round of phone calls.

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