Last week, US President Barack Obama unveiled a new National Security Strategy. The document was hailed by many as a definitive – and welcome – departure from his predecessor’s approach towards security and foreign policy, and then promptly pushed out of the headlines. Indeed, Obama’s outline of strategic goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan was widely dismissed as ‘same old, same old.’ But certain aspects of the security document pertaining to Pakistan deviate significantly from previous thinking, and bear closer scrutiny by our government.

Obama’s new security strategy includes contradictory messages of cooperation and aggression that are directly relevant to the situation currently unfolding in North Waziristan.

On the one hand, the doctrine – which has been praised for its realism, caution, and humility – warns against military over-reaching, states that war should not be waged without the deployment of ‘complementary tools,’ and calls for comprehensive engagement with strong allies. This language suggests that Obama has, in fact, broken from George W. Bush’s doctrine of unilateralism.

Significantly, the new document also eradicates any mention of the ‘war against terror,’ and clarifies that the US is not confronting the religion of Islam or the Islamic world. All mentions of Islamists, jihadists, Islamic radicalism, fundamentalism, or extremism have faced the delete button. Instead, the document specifically states that the US is waging a “global campaign” against Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates, with the aim to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” the terrorist organisation and deny it safe havens. And there’s the rub.

On Monday, news circulated of the death of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, the third-highest ranking Al Qaeda commander – he is believed to have been killed along with his family in a US drone attack in North Waziristan about two weeks ago. Then again, on Wednesday, a militant group announced that Osama bin Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan Al-Dawsari, another top Al Qaeda commander, had been killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan.

Soon after Yazid’s death was reported, Admiral Mike Mullen stated on Fox News that Washington is aware that Al Qaeda’s leadership is operating from Pakistani soil. US homeland security adviser John Brennan also announced that the US is prepared to “take the fight” to extremists, wherever they may be, including Pakistan. And American newspapers leaked the fact that the US military has reviewed options for unilateral strikes against Pakistan in the event of an ‘extreme’ attack against the US that is traced to this country. These beating war drums contradict the conciliatory tone of most of Obama’s national security review, and raise important questions about US-Pakistan relations.

To be fair, the document emphasises cooperation, mutual interest, and capacity building for Pakistan in a counter-terrorism context. But now that Obama has clearly and narrowly pointed to Al Qaeda as an enemy the US will pursue at all cost, will Washington stand idly by if Islamabad continues to dither over what to do in North Waziristan?

The Pakistan Army has already announced that it will move into the tribal agency on its own timeline, and according to the terms of its own strategy. Initially, it was understood that our army would strike against those militants who have been targeting the Pakistani state. One can now expect that Al Qaeda commanders will also be targeted during any future military operation. However, one cannot imagine that this hands-off approach will be the extent of the US’s drive to eliminate Al Qaeda’s operations base in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

In April it was reported that the US has deployed miniature drones carrying smaller missiles and equipped with advanced surveillance gadgets. These are meant to facilitate more accurate strikes with fewer civilian casualties – their deployment indicates that Washington means to continue with, and perhaps even escalate, its intense drone campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Moreover, The New York Times recently reported that General David Petraeus had signed a secret directive in September authorising US Special Operations troops to launch clandestine missions in both “friendly and hostile” nations. The purported goal of these secret activities is to gather intelligence, develop local networks, and prepare the ground for US troop movement, if ever required.

In the spirit of transparency and accountability, Washington and Islamabad must clarify and make public the extent of US involvement in Pakistan’s security affairs. We have already seen how much dissimulation the two states are capable of in the matter of the drone attacks and private security firms. Even now, as international legal and rights groups seek to take action against Washington for the extra-judicial executions of suspected criminals, the question of Islamabad’s complicity and approval of the drone campaign remains a sticking point.

There should also be a clear conversation about the two governments’ divergent priorities in the fight against extremism. Al Qaeda is America’s problem; the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and its growing network of militant outfits in Pakistan’s heartland are ours. What happens when the security goals of the two engaged, strong allies do not align? Will the US take unilateral action in Pakistan’s tribal areas against Al Qaeda, whose members have been conveniently termed ‘non-state actors’ by our government? Will such action proceed with Pakistan’s approval, or will it be tantamount to a military invasion?

Both Islamabad and Washington owe it to the Pakistani public to answer these questions. Decades of clandestine meetings and the exchange of military or civilian aid for the right to dictate Pakistan’s security agenda have left even progressive Pakistanis disillusioned and skeptical of Washington’s regional goals. Despite much talk of increased transparency and people-to-people contact during US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan last autumn, we seem to have entered even murkier diplomatic waters.

As the US steps up its campaign against Al Qaeda, it must call for clear diplomatic and security-related agreements with Pakistan (vague references to ‘joint efforts’ and ‘intelligence cooperation’ with our establishment will not do). Washington and Islamabad should also jointly approach international organisations to monitor and evaluate the methodology of counter-insurgency operations in the tribal areas in an effort to remain transparent and accountable. Such pre-emptive and robust diplomacy would be the only way to ensure that the spirit of Obama’s supposedly revolutionary security strategy is kept alive.

The United States and Nato have long been pressurising Pakistan to launch a military operation in North Waziristan. Now that the army has agreed in principle to open that Pandora’s Box of militancy, the instigators are disassociating from the operation. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has announced that his country is not ‘pushing’ Pakistan to make this move, while Nato has declared that the timing and strategy of the operation are to be fully of the Pakistan Army’s choosing.

This magnanimity does not signal a shift in policy, nor does it indicate that the US has truly come to trust Pakistan as an equal partner in its prolonged war against terror. No, western security forces are backing off from plans to launch the offensive because it’s going to be messy – very messy.

North Waziristan has long been home to Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s militant group, which has struck two peace accords with the Pakistan government (in 2006 and 2008) and therefore refrains from launching attacks against government and army personnel and property in Fata or elsewhere. Previously, Bahadur has prevented other militants, including Baitullah Mehsud, from launching attacks against Pakistan from his territory, and is responsible for expelling many Arab and Central Asian militants from the agencies.

In return for this cooperation, the Bahadur group has been allowed to flourish and is now well-entrenched in North Waziristan: it runs a parallel administration boasting recruiting offices for militants, training camps, madrassahs, separate courts and jails, and its own taxation policy. If an offensive in the tribal agency disrupts the Bahadur group, the army will face a well-armed and well-organised force that will no longer have any reason to keep foreign fighters at bay.

North Waziristan also serves as a base for the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, which primarily targets coalition forces in Afghanistan. The Haqqanis are old friends of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, and continue to be cultivated as contacts that could prove useful as political allies in a post-US Afghanistan. This network, too, has not attacked the Pakistani state, but may change its modus operandi if a military operation were to be directed against its fighters.

As the only one of Fata’s seven agencies that has not been the site of a military operation, North Waziristan has recently seen an influx of TTP militants fleeing army action elsewhere. Indeed, a list of all the groups whose activities have been traced back to the tribal agency reads like a who’s-who of regional militancy: extreme offshoots of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkatul Jehadul Islami, a new group spearheaded by the militant commander Ilyas Kashmiri, remnants of Uzbek and Chechen groups, and, by some accounts, Lashkar-e-Taiba. The agency is also believed to be the hiding place of Al Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri.

Taking on this hornet’s nest of militancy will be no small task for the Pakistan Army. Its job is made even harder by the shifting allegiances of the various militant groups themselves. There have been reports of a brewing conflict between the Afghan militant groups that maintain ties to the Pakistani establishment and elements of the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ that have started to act independently. The recent murder of former ISI official Khalid Khawaja was another sign of the shifting ground on which the security establishment has to operate. Under these circumstances, any attempts at backchannel negotiations or plans to maintain a ceasefire with certain groups will be tenuous – militant groups that have historically sided with the Pakistan state may splinter into more dangerous and unpredictable entities.

Matters are made worse by the complete lack of intelligence from the agency. Militants have killed hundreds of people suspected of spying for the US or Pakistani governments – just this week, two men were strapped with explosives and blown up in public on similar charges. The intensified drone attacks in North Waziristan since the start of this year have made the militants extremely cautious about leaking information. Hakeemullah Mehsud’s recent ‘resurrection’ indicated just how little is known about what’s happening in the agency.

Given this scenario, a botched operation in North Waziristan could further decentralise and disperse the terror threat. If the Pakistan Army moves into the agency without a clear sense of its goals (dismantling all militant networks, or only those targeting Pakistan, or the US?) or confidence in certain allegiances, up to 50,000 fighters from various groups could spread across the country, causing mayhem. Movement towards cells in Karachi and the southern Punjab would also be likely, leading to the creation of new North Waziristans in the heartland of Pakistan.

To prevent this nightmare from becoming a reality, the Pakistan Army should consolidate the gains it has made in other parts of Fata and create a network of locals willing to stem infiltration by militants from North Waziristan. Rather than launch a full-fledged, indiscriminate campaign, the army should also stick to earlier plans of launching contained attacks against specific targets – given the potential horrifying consequences for Pakistan, this is not the time to kowtow to foreign demands for a grander operation.

A limited operation will also rule out the need to bring more troops into the vicinity (there are currently about 140,000 troops in the agency, mostly stationed in Miranshah). This is important because military action in Fata since 2005 has earned the ire of non-combatant agency residents – they complain they have lost more lives and property because of army action than militant presence.

This perception has fueled the rate of militant recruitment in the area, and the last thing the North Waziristan operation should do is win more youngsters over to the militant cause. To this end, the army should work with the civilian government to raise enough funds beforehand to accommodate the IDPs who will inevitably escape the operation, and to compensate civilians for damage to their property.

More importantly, the army should also limit US involvement in the form of sustained drone attacks in any operation – this must be Pakistan’s fight, fought on Pakistan’s terms, with Pakistan’s best interests in mind.

Afghan leader and many Pakistani militants have been reported to be hiding in , where the Afghan insurgency’s No. 2 was captured last week.

The arrest of a senior Afghan Taliban commander in Karachi, made last week and revealed Tuesday, adds to growing reports that militants are using the Pakistani city as an organizational hub and safe haven.

, the second in command to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was apprehended in a joint raid by Pakistani and American intelligence agencies, though a Taliban spokesman denied this.

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In recent months, local and international media have reported that Taliban commanders fleeing military operations in and in Pakistani tribal areas have relocated to Karachi, which is the country’s largest city and has largely avoided the that have struck the northwest and other major cities.

Karachi also has a large population of Pashtuns, the ethnic group to which most members of the Afghan and belong. Though the city’s ruling party takes a tough line against the Taliban, militants are able to conceal their activities within the city’s sprawling slums.

In recent months, intelligence officials quoted by the and a based in have said that Mullah Omar himself was hiding in Karachi, but the Pakistani government denied this.

Earlier this month, Taliban sources told the that Pakistani Taliban leader , who had been injured in a US drone strike in January, died en route to Karachi for medical treatment. Uncertainty still swirls around Mr. Mehsud, however. US and Pakistani officials have said they believe Mr. Mehsud is dead, but Taliban sources say he’s still alive.

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According to a police investigator with the Special Investigation Unit, tasked with counterterrorism operations, not only leaders but also other militants are present in Karachi.

“There is a network of [Pakistani] Taliban fighters scattered across the city,” the SIU officer says, speaking on the condition of anonymity. He estimates that about 150 Taliban militants from the tribal region reside in Karachi. They include , who coordinate with local criminal gangs and sectarian groups to smuggle arms to the tribal areas and arrange funding, he says.

Some Taliban members also visit Karachi to recruit locals for an attack or theft, the officer continues. “The Taliban here are like fixers. When they’re planning an attack or robbery [in Karachi] men are brought in from the tribal areas” to carry it out.”

A few dozen suspected militants currently sit in police custody awaiting trial in the Anti-Terrorism Court, he adds.

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Since 2008, Pakistani police and intelligence agencies have claimed that the Taliban use Karachi, the country’s financial capital, to raise funds for militants based along the border of and .

Last December, the main suspect in the largest bank heist in Pakistani history, which occurred in Karachi’s financial district, was found to have links to the Taliban. According to a recent statement from the Interior ministry, of the dozen bank robberies that occurred in Karachi in 2009, 80 percent could be traced back to individuals based in the tribal areas who were believed to have links with the Taliban.

Those responsible for the Nov. 26 2008 attacks in , , reportedly i and phoned a coordinator here during the assault.

The statement by Kai Eide, former United Nations special envoy to Afghanistan, indicating that the recent arrests of top Taliban commanders in Karachi had a “negative” effect has certainly irritated many Pakistanis. The sentiment is, after all, a direct contradiction of the United States mantra, “do more.” As suicide and bomb attacks continue apace across Pakistan, these mixed signals from the international community – and our government’s reaction to them – make a mockery of the human and civic toll of terrorism in our country.

Eide’s complaint is that the arrests of Taliban second-in-command Mullah Baradar and other members of the Quetta Shura have stalled efforts to find a political resolution to the war in Afghanistan. His contention is that the Pakistani authorities knowingly arrested key players in back channel negotiations.

The US has offered a swift rebuttal to this point of view, stating that Washington was “extremely gratified” by the arrests. Our Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, continues its tight-rope act, saying everything and nothing to keep everybody and nobody happy. Responding to Eide, a ministry spokesman asserted that the arrests were part of a joint operation with the US, and without addressing Eide’s accusation that “Pakistanis did not play the role they should have,” reiterated Islamabad’s support for a reconciliation process.

This jumble can be seen a direct consequence of the Obama administration’s Af-Pak strategy, announced exactly a year ago. That strategy introduced three new dimensions: the announcement that US troops would leave Afghanistan by July 2011; the decision to treat Afghanistan and Pakistan as separate countries, with distinct interests, yet facing a common challenge; and the overly optimistic call for a regional approach balancing the interests of all stakeholders, including India, China, Russia, and Iran. The repercussions of these are now starting to play out.

The disagreement between the UN and the US about the usefulness of the Taliban arrests points to different opinions about how America’s exit strategy from the region should be executed. The UN, United Kingdom, and European Union believe that a political settlement with the Afghan Taliban must be pursued alongside military goals, and that international bodies such as the UN should serve as neutral mediators. For this to work, talks need to start immediately.

The US, on the other hand, wants to focus on military operations and continue weakening the Taliban until they arrive at the negotiating table with heads hung low. As long as these different approaches vie for supremacy, Pakistan’s dealings with the Afghan Taliban will be variously perceived on the two sides of the Atlantic.

The long-term implications of the decision to treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as distinct entities, and to emphasise a coordinated regional strategy, are also starting to clamour for clarity. The fact is, until the various interests of stakeholders are made transparent and then systematically addressed, political games, power struggles, and proxy battles will continue (at the time of Barader’s arrest, many analysts speculated that Islamabad was indeed trying to hold the negotiations process hostage).

In recent weeks, the international community has become more honest about Pakistan’s stakes in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, General David Petraeus acknowledged that the Pakistan Army’s obsession with strategic depth is valid. And speaking at MIT, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband conceded that Pakistan ‘holds the keys’ to security and dialogue in Afghanistan, and that Islamabad must be a partner in any solutions to Afghanistan. For his part, during a recent visit to Islamabad, Afghan President Hamid Karzai stated that Pakistan should be involved in dialogue with the Taliban.

But a more up-front approach is needed so that mixed signals such as Eide’s critique do not become de rigueur – and the best place to start is with India. During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama talked about a resolution on Kashmir being the real solution to the Afghanistan problem. At that time, he was envisioning announcing an Af-Pak-India strategy in the event of being elected. That strategy acknowledged that Pakistan will continue to see militants as strategic assets and want influence over Kabul as long as an Indian threat is perceived on its eastern border. However, New Delhi’s rejection of any mediated dialogue on Kashmir forced Washington to change its tune, and it has left Islamabad and New Delhi to their own devices.

But the time has come to highlight India’s continuing impact on Obama’s Af-Pak strategy, not least because, in the wake of a US withdrawal, New Delhi – along with Tehran and Moscow, the traditional backers of the Northern Alliance – will see it as their responsibility to keep Afghanistan stable. It is Pakistan’s known concerns about this exact scenario that make its motives regarding Afghanistan dubious in the eyes of the international community.

Rather than continue to critique Pakistan’s actions – and distract it from addressing the spiraling threat of terrorism within its own borders – Washington and multilateral organisations such as the UN should address its concerns head on.

During the high-level strategic dialogue in Washington next week, Pakistan plans to explain its concerns about Indian political and economic investment in Afghanistan. In turn, the US is expected to explain why it no longer sees India as a threat to Pakistan. One hopes this conversation is productive, and that it quickly leads to more concrete discussions about joint development projects in Afghanistan that reflect the interests of all stakeholders as well as a new emphasis on trade and transit that economically integrate Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy has clearly shifted. And, once again, like a wife whose husband is cheating on her, Pakistanis are the last to know. The disclaimers issuing from Islamabad since the arrest of Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Baradar have reached new highs of dissimulation. Rather than continue to stoke the suspicions of the polity, the Pakistan government should make its policy towards the Taliban – both Pakistani and Afghan – transparent.

Baradar’s arrest, followed by the capture of several other Al Qaeda-linked militants, indicates that Islamabad has decided to crack down against Afghan militants on Pakistani soil. The arrests have been seen as evidence of close cooperation between Pakistani and American intelligence agencies. Soon after Baradar’s arrest, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs hailed the increased cooperation between the ISI and CIA.

That’s when the double speak began to issue forth. Interior Minister Rehman Malik termed news of Baradar’s arrest – reportedly the result of an ISI-CIA joint operation – “propaganda.” Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated that Pakistani authorities had made the arrests “because it is in our interests to do so.” And US special envoy Richard Holbrooke denied that the arrests had anything to do with America’s recently revamped Afghanistan policy.

Such statements are proliferating because there are many theories about why Pakistan has decided to pursue the Afghan Taliban: the arrests are quid pro quo for US drone strikes that killed Baitullah – and possibly, Hakeemullah – Mehsud; the arrests are a small measure to appease the US while Pakistan keeps up its double game; the arrests are meant to decrease the trust deficit between Islamabad and Washington, so that Pakistan is invited to mediate any future negotiations between the US, Afghan government, and the Taliban.

Some analysts have also suggested that Baradar’s arrest is an attempt to force Pakistan’s place at the negotiating table, for one of two reasons. Firstly, Baradar is reported to have tried to disassociate the Afghan Taliban from Pakistani intelligence – by removing him from the playing field, our authorities are hoping to stay in the game. Alternatively, since Baradar is now in Pakistani custody, any engagement with him necessarily has to include Pakistan, thereby reinstating our government to its historic role as mediator.

The various motives assigned to Pakistan for taking on the Afghan Taliban all point to the same endgame: Islamabad wants to retain influence over the government in Kabul. Not only does the Pakistan Army continue to think Afghanistan is essential for purposes of ‘strategic depth,’ but now there are also concerns about an expanding Indian presence. Moreover, Islamabad needs to maintain close ties with Kabul to manage aspirations for a ‘greater Afghanistan,’ which would envelop Pakistan’s Pashto-speaking population as well.

In a sense, then, Pakistan’s ultimate goals for the region are clearly laid out. But our government has to be more transparent about the means it is employing to achieve that end. Is the plan to cooperate with the US so that Washington urges Kabul to reach out to Islamabad? Or is the idea to become the first point of contact between the Taliban and the rest of the world so that, in the event the Taliban rejoin Afghanistan’s political process, Islamabad is already established as an ally?

In Pakistan’s case, the answer lies somewhere between these two scenarios. Indeed, our authorities’ preparations for all possible outcomes to the US-led war against terror in Afghanistan are widely acknowledged. But as this balancing act ensues, Pakistanis must be kept in the loop. The fact is, we now risk a situation in which our government is well ingratiated with Washington and Kabul, but has lost all credibility in the eyes of its public.

For months now, Pakistan has been acting coy about the extent of its cooperation with US intelligence, even though all signs of a growing partnership are evident. Despite the fact that General Ashfaq Kayani described the Waziristans as an “intelligence black hole,” 2010 has seen a dramatic escalation in US drone attacks. Many of these have been successful in targeting high-value militants such as Hakeemullah, Pan Am 73 hijacker Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim, and now, Mohammed Haqqani.

In recent weeks, Pakistani and US officials have been more open about the fact that Pakistani military and intelligence are feeding targeting information to US intelligence. Our government has also acknowledged that Blackwater operatives are present in Pakistan. These revelations have fueled anti-Americanism, but they have also angered Pakistanis who believe that their government is answerable, first and foremost, to the public at large. In this context, the policy shift towards Afghan Taliban could spur the public’s mistrust of the government.

Since the crackdown against Afghan Taliban also involves arrests, detentions, and interrogations, it is essential that the authorities come clean about their plans for dealing with foreign suspected terrorists. Currently, Pakistan is leading Baradar’s interrogation, with some American involvement. Malik, meanwhile, has stated that Baradar will not be handed over to the US; rather, he could be deported to Afghanistan. If he is accused of wrongdoing in Pakistan, however, Baradar will be tried locally.

The Pakistani state is already burdened with the legacy of General Pervez Musharraf’s decision to run secret prisons for terror suspects and enable extraordinary rendition. Over the years, the missing persons issue has torn the country apart, and will remain a stain on Pakistan’s human rights record. The recent outcry against Dr Aafia Siddiqui’s verdict is a reminder that this issue has hit a nerve amongst Pakistanis: they do not want their government participating in more machinations involving interrogations, terror suspects, and the US.

In other words, the issue of joint operations and intelligence sharing between Pakistani and American agencies may seem like a foreign policy issue. But the fallout of Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy will be distinctly local – nothing less than the government’s credibility with its own people is at stake.

Thousands of political and social activists and students across on Thursday protested the conviction of by a jury for the attempted murder of soldiers in .

Siddiqui, a US-educated neuroscientist and Pakistani citizen was found guilty Wednesday. For many Pakistanis, the verdict is another example of the US government’s high-handedness and is expected to fuel anti-American sentiment in a country where ‘s foreign policy is .

“The public’s reaction [to the conviction] can be read as a reaction to drone attacks, travel restrictions, and other discriminatory policies [against Pakistanis],” says , a political and defense analyst at ’s .

Pakistani opposition parties and human rights activists had already been protesting an escalation of strikes against targets in Pakistan by US drones – in January, 123 civilians were reportedly killed in 12 attacks. “Aafia’s case has become a rallying point for anti-US sentiments,” says Dr. Hussain.

Siddiqui was missing for five years before being apprehended by Afghan police in 2008. During the trial, jurors heard that she had been caught carrying bomb-making instructions and a list of landmarks.

and US soldiers testified that during her interrogation at an Afghan police station, she grabbed an assault rifle that one of her interrogators had set down, thinking that Siddiqi was restrained, and shot at him. She was wounded when he returned fire and brought to the US for trial.

Siddiqi said that she was shot when she peered around a curtain in a bid to find a way out of the room where she was being held, and had not shot at anyone.

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Many Pakistanis believe that Siddiqi was picked up in the southern port city of in 2003 and detained at , a US facility in Afghanistan, where she was allegedly tortured.

“The Americans should be warned that their tactics and fake convictions will not intimidate us,” says Aaliya Shamim, a spokesperson of the women’s wing of the , a religious political party.

on Thursday organized a protest that drew hundreds of women who called for Siddiqui’s release and decried US involvement in Pakistani affairs. “We can no longer sit quietly; every mother and sister will fight for justice against America,” she said.

Protests against Siddiqui’s alleged ill-treatment while in detention have been ongoing during her trial. Those who believe the trial has been politicized from the start saw Thursday’s public reaction as inevitable.

“Siddiqui’s family has been saying that this verdict was expected, implying that the US cannot be fair,” says Sana Saleem, a Karachi-based political blogger. “Aafia herself has been playing the political and religious card during her trial.”

On being convicted, Siddiqui claimed the verdict was prompted by .

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But there is also a local dimension to the widespread protests. In recent years, human rights groups have accused Pakistani intelligence agencies of illegally detaining terror suspects. According to the ,  Siddiqui had become the public face of Pakistan’s “missing persons” after she vanished from Karachi with her three children.

“We are protesting the verdict, and we are protesting against our government,” says , the chair of the Pakistan Youth Alliance, an activist group that participated in a civil society protest against the verdict in Islamabad’s Blue Area. He argues that Siddiqui’s case must be seen in a “broader perspective.”

“How can we criticize the US when our own government has been complicit in illegally detaining innocents?” asks Zaidi. According to Defence of Human Rights, an independent organization advocating for the release of all missing persons, more than 100 Pakistani women remain in illegal detention.

Siddiqui’s conviction is expected to put pressure on ’s government, which is already perceived locally as an American proxy. “The government needs to handle this issue with circumspection,” says Dr. Hussain, who suggested that Pakistan appeal the verdict. The Pakistani embassy in Washington has already expressed “dismay” at Siddiqui’s conviction.

“It’ll be a balancing act for the government,” says blogger . “We have to respect judicial systems no matter what, even if they go against our expectations.”

In the matter of reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghan society, the question is no longer whether to talk or not. President Hamid Karzai has already invited the Taliban to a peace jirga and UN representatives allegedly met members of the Quetta Shura in Dubai to discuss the possibility of direct talks. US General Stanley McChrystal even has access to a $1.5 billon Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to provide ‘incentives’ to militants to put down their arms. Thus, the question now should be whether or not talks can work.

Although the Dubai meeting remains unconfirmed, Karzai’s willingness to engage the Taliban leadership is bolstered by reports within Afghan diplomatic and military circles that certain militant commanders are tired of fighting and eager for a negotiated end to conflict. The plan is to bring those Taliban who cut ties with Al Qaeda and abandon violence back into the social and political fold by offering security, vocational training, jobs, and amnesty for past crimes.

It is unclear, however, whether Al Qaeda and those Taliban who do not seek amnesty will let this happen. In recent months, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban have brutally assassinated anyone suspected of being an informer. And in Afghanistan, militant commanders who have surrendered to the government have been promptly gunned down.

For talks to work, the Karzai administration will have to ensure security for militants who reach out to the government and accept amnesty. This will not be an easy task given the fledgling ranks of the Afghan military and police (even if targets set in London this week are met by 2011, there will not be enough security forces to protect ‘reintegrated’ Taliban in 34 of the country’s 36 provinces). It doesn’t help that hard-line Taliban factions have already infiltrated the Afghan security forces.

Until Karzai can promise security, talks could simply lead to more violence in the form of militant infighting. And if ISAF troops are required to help ensure security for reintegrated militants, the idea of talks may be stillborn since the Taliban have made it clear that their primary demand is the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil.

Assuming security can be guaranteed, the talks may yet stall owing to friction between Kabul and Washington. Currently, Karzai wants to reach out to all Taliban, including leaders such as Mullah Omar. The US, however, is in favour of engaging mid- and low-level militants, 70 per cent of who are believed to fight for local reasons or money, rather than ideological reasons.

It seems unlikely that the US will whole-heartedly support reintegration efforts that grant amnesty to those high-ranking Taliban who sheltered and facilitated Osama bin Laden or worked closely with Al Qaeda. If Karzai insists on engaging top Taliban leadership, Washington may reduce its involvement (in the form of billion-dollar funds) in the talks. In that event, negotiations will only work if the international community steps up to counter the shortfall. In London, world leaders pledged $1.4 million to win over low-level militants. But far more will be required in coming years.

Regional stakeholders – each with their own agenda for protecting their national interests in Afghanistan – are also in a position to derail talks. Take Pakistan, for example. The fact that we have been left out of all secret talks between the Afghan government and Taliban through 2009 highlights the fact that our involvement could be a game changer. Although it is accepted that negotiations with the Taliban cannot bear fruit without ISI involvement, the Afghan and US governments have indicated that they do not trust our intelligence agencies’ motives.

There are concerns that the ISI will want to install those Taliban commanders with whom it has strong ties in the Afghan government, especially since the current administration is hostile towards Pakistan. If involved in negotiations, the ISI could tip the balance in favour of sympathetic Taliban commanders by offering better incentives.

But as Ahmed Rashid points out, the Afghan Taliban are weary of being manipulated by the ISI. In the past few years they have become enmeshed with the anti-state Pakistani Taliban, grown closer to Afghan intelligence agencies, and articulated their own ideological and political goals for Afghanistan.

Pakistan will want reintegrated Taliban to look out for Islamabad’s interests, discourage an Indian presence in Afghanistan to allay fears of encirclement, and reassure the Pakistan Army of the option of strategic depth. But in a role reversal, Pakistan may find that an Afghan government comprising former Taliban commanders is willing to provide safe havens for TTP militants and exert a potentially destabilising influence over Pakistan’s Pashto-speaking population.

If such divergent agendas are detected, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies could jeopardise talks. The fact is, negotiations can only succeed if all stakeholders, particularly Pakistan and India, prioritise regional stability over national agendas – this, unfortunately, is a long shot.

Finally, there’s the question of what demands the Taliban will bring to the negotiating table. In a November 2009 statement, Mullah Omar offered a vision of an Afghanistan free of ‘foreign invaders’ – there was no explicit mention of an Islamic state. But Pakistan’s experiences with the TTP in Fata and Sufi Mohammad’s TNSM in Swat have revealed that extremist ideas of governance are vastly different from those of the international community, and inevitably include a harsh interpretation and implementation of Sharia law. Afghan women’s rights activists are already balking at the suggestion of talking to the Taliban while Afghan lawmakers warn that militants want absolute power, and will not settle for a role in the democratic process.

Until top Taliban commanders publicly welcome talks, there are too many unknowns to say whether reintegration can succeed. In the meantime, Pakistan should think through how best to balance our country’s interests with Afghanistan’s future prospects, and prepare to let the Karzai administration take the lead.

Earlier this week, US President Barack Obama identified Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia as the four places where terrorists were planning attacks against America. The inclusion of Yemen on that list should be of interest to Pakistanis, for the rise of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula could have direct bearing on our war against terror. Not only can we see many parallels between the two countries’ fights against militancy, but the international community’s involvement in Yemen – particularly that of Saudi Arabia and the US – could also have an impact on Fata-based militant networks.

Even before Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab – the Nigerian who tried to bring down a US airliner after spending time in Yemen – made headlines, there had been growing concerns about Al Qaeda consolidating its presence in the Arabian Peninsula. In December, Yemeni security forces, backed by US aid and intelligence, carried out two strikes on Al Qaeda hideouts in Yemen, killing over 60 militants. Raids of Al Qaeda camps closed out the year.

These initiatives by the Yemeni government come a year after militants based in Saudi Arabia and Yemen announced a merger to form Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in January 2009, declaring Yemen its base. According to Yemeni officials, there are up to 300 Al Qaeda operatives in the country, including about 85 Saudi Arabians who fled the kingdom’s armed campaign against terrorists between 2003 and 2006.

Initially, the government in Yemen tolerated Al Qaeda presence, and even released 170 detainees with suspected links to Al Qaeda in February 2009. Analysts believed the conciliatory move was an attempt to ward off attacks by Al Qaeda on Yemeni soil. But in August last year, a Yemeni suicide bomber managed to wound Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, who is in charge of Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism program. That attack, along with the Christmas Day US airliner plot, has thrown the spotlight on AQAP.

Security analysts think the resurgence of AQAP may be linked to the Pakistan Army’s operations against militants in South Waziristan and Bajaur agencies. Fata has long hosted foreign fighters – last year, reports circulated that there are up to 8,000 foreign fighters in Pakistan – many of whom are Arabs. During recent military operations, militants native to the tribal belt have been able to flee into Afghanistan or camouflage as IDPs and merge with the population of the Frontier province, resulting in the ongoing surge of suicide attacks. Arabs and other foreigners who are more conspicuous have, however, been forced to leave this region. Many have traveled to Yemen and Somalia to join local militant operations there.

It is for this reason that Pakistan should follow AQAP-related developments. A crackdown on Al Qaeda in Yemen could result in a reverse flow of militants back to this region – added incentive for our government and armed forces to secure those parts of the tribal belts that it claims to have flushed of terrorists.

And a crackdown is imminent. After Abdulmutallab’s plot was foiled, Obama vowed to accelerate the US offensive against terror cells in Yemen. Right-wing hawks are already calling for pre-emptive action against AQAP in Yemen. Throughout 2009, the US has provided US$ 67 million worth of intelligence, surveillance and training to Yemeni forces under the Pentagon’s counterterrorism program, an amount second only to Pakistan.

Until now, the Yemeni government has cooperated quite well with the US in targeting AQAP, despite public outrage at the possibility that the US could have conducted December’s military strikes and raids against militant hideouts (both governments insist that US involvement is restricted to training and intelligence). If the Obama administration continues to enjoy cooperation from the Yemeni government – which has, in recent weeks, expressed unambiguous willingness to target AQAP – Washington could put pressure on Islamabad to commit to a similar crackdown against Pakistan-based militants planning attacks on US soil or other foreign targets.

Saudi Arabia’s involvement in pursuing AQAP in Yemen could also impact Pakistan’s war against terrorism. The kingdom is aware that a stronger Al Qaeda along its border could result in more terror attacks on Saudi soil. Already, the Saudi armed forces have launched artillery attacks against Yemeni rebels called Houthis, followers of the Zaidi sect of Shia Islam (Riyadh has alleged that the Houthis have ties to Iran and links to Al Qaeda and are hellbent on destabilising the peninsula). In previous months, the Houthis have attacked Saudi border guards and soldiers, kidnapping or killing them.

Although there is little evidence of links between Al Qaeda and Houthi rebels, it is acknowledged that AQAP is taking advantage of the unrest along the Saudi-Yemen border to take root in the area. To protect is own interests, Saudi Arabia may well extend its strikes against Houthis to AQAP hideouts as well.

Moreover, analysts believe that the consolidation of AQAP presence in Yemen could motivate Saudi Arabia to systematically address the issue of terror financing. For years, it has been reported that individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia are a primary source of funding for Al Qaeda. A Council on Foreign Relations report explains that many Saudis fund terror unknowingly because “terror groups collect funds under the guise of Islamic charities and schools.”

If the threat of a robust Al Qaeda presence in the Arabian Peninsula moves Riyadh to better monitor Saudi charities, thereby curbing terror financing, Pakistan will certainly reap the benefits. After all, there can be no defeating Fata-based militants until their financing is permanently cut off. Ultimately, by dragging Saudi Arabia into the community of nations worried about militant attacks on its soil, AQAP’s resurgence in Yemen has indirectly affected the future course of Pakistan’s push against militancy in this region.

US President Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech was hailed by pundits for being well reasoned, humble, realistic, and yet visionary. Many have taken solace in his conception of a ‘just war,’ one that is waged in self-defence, uses proportional force, and aims to restore peace. But Pakistanis have probably noted that Obama’s latest rhetorical outing reiterates the US’s right to act unilaterally in the name of national, or for that matter, global security.

On Thursday, the president described the complicated nature of international security initiatives and the contemporary paradox of wars within – rather than between – states, in the form of insurgencies and secessionist movements. He highlighted these issues to argue that a ‘just war’ can also “[extend] beyond self-defence or the defence of one nation against an aggressor” as long as the restoration of peace is the real goal.

Coupled with Obama’s West Point speech concerning troop escalation in Afghanistan, the prize acceptance contextualizes recent developments regarding action by the US security infrastructure against Al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan. Interestingly, this is not a call for Pakistan to ‘do more,’ nor is it a call for more joint action against terrorism. The speech seems to justify the US’s decision to start taking matters into its own hands in dealing with the threat it believes emanates from Pakistan. In other words, it’s an argument in favour of more ‘just’ unilateral action.

In writing this, I am not trying to fuel another conspiracy theory regarding America’s motives in the region – the US’s plans to tackle Al Qaeda here have been laid bare in newspaper headlines. I am simply pointing out that whatever ‘war’ the US is fighting here may be justified by Obama’s definition, but it certainly doesn’t feel that way to most Pakistanis.

In a recent op-ed in The New York Times, President Asif Zardari argued that “public mistrust of the United States [in Pakistan] … stems from regional issues, specifically policies concerning India,” and the “perceived rhetorical one-sidedness of American policy.” These days, however, Pakistani suspicions about the US have more to do with intelligence networks and ground presence than diplomatic relations with India.

Speaking at West Point, Obama called for better intelligence to “stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.” Since then, Pakistani government officials have been fielding questions about the reported expansion of covert CIA resources in this country. Clearly, the enhancement of US intelligence networks in Pakistan is a development our establishment was not consulted on, as the best Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has been able to say about the matter is that Pakistan is ‘looking into’ this new American policy.

The news of a greater CIA presence comes on the heels of an announcement earlier this month that the White House has authorised an expansion of the CIA’s controversial drone programme in Pakistan’s tribal areas, with a heightened possibility of strikes in Balochistan.

America’s plans to eliminate the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, which US intelligence believes is in Balochistan, certainly fit Obama’s neat construct of a ‘just war’ – it’s unilateral action in self-defence, after all. But recent reports in American papers suggest US actions are preventing us Pakistanis from waging our own ‘just war,’ on our soil, on our terms. The Washington Times, for example, reported that CIA officials have been hoarding intelligence on Al Qaeda in Balochistan since 2007, according to Pakistani defence officials.

Whatever the US’s justifications for threatening more unilateral action in Balochistan – both in the form of increased intelligence surveillance and drone strikes – they have made our security establishment jumpy. On Friday, Defence Minister Ahmad Mukhtar acknowledged the existence of the Quettaauthentic cialis free trial, announced that Pakistani security forces had take action against it, and assured that it no longer poses a threat. In the blogosphere, this announcement is being seen as an effort to circumvent direct US action in Balochistan.

On a separate note, Obama’s Nobel speech emphasised that ‘just wars’ are fought in adherence with strict standards. At the same time, The New York Times has reported that Blackwater operatives worked with CIA officials during sensitive “snatch and grab” operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The report aimed to highlight that there is a far “deeper relationship” between the agency and the private security firm than the US government likes to admit.

Blackwater’s transgressions have no place in Obama’s description of ‘just’ warfare. If the CIA is to have an expanded role in this region, the US government has to prioritise decoupling the agency and the firm. The CIA’s decision, announced Saturday, to cancel a contract for Blackwater operatives to load bombs onto drone aircraft is a small step in the right direction (the loading will now be done by CIA officials, and drone attacks will continue). But an even more transparent understanding of the role of private security firms in US warfare is necessary at this time.

Unfortunately, unilateral and covert measures to tackle Al Qaeda are bound to raise questions about more useful, joint initiatives against terrorism. On Friday, the US House of Representatives cleared US$ 700 million for the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capability Fund, with which the US is providing counterterrorism training to Frontier Corps personnel.

There are currently 80 to 100 US Special Operations forces, including 35 trainers, working with the FC in the Frontier province. About 1,000 FC men have received training, though the goal is to train over 9,000 paramilitary troops and expand the initiative into the tribal areas. It is unclear whether more trainers will be needed to achieve these goals. But if CIA involvement here is ramped up, Pakistanis are bound to reject the official presence of US Special Ops forces on this side of the border.

The fact is, if the US aims to wage ‘just wars’ using unjust means, it will find little support for its legitimate efforts to bolster global security.