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Posted on November 4, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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There’s one thing the world is learning about Pakistan: this is a nation that likes binaries. Civil and military; Islam and secularism; dictatorships and democracies; China and the US; Sufi and Salafi. Whether it’s an ideology, a policy, or an alliance, if it’s double-edged, two-pronged, or Janus-faced, chances are we will have an affinity for it. It thus comes as no surprise that theories about why Pakistan is reluctant to pursue militant groups that enjoy safe havens within its border feature two culprits: India and Afghanistan.
WikiLeaks added a fresh spin to the India theory this week by revealing Indian perceptions of the Pakistan Army as “hypnotically obsessed” with its rival military. Indeed, the `strategic assets` argument about Pakistan`s patience for militant sanctuaries persists in many circles, despite the fact that militant groups have targeted about 300 ISI personnel and attacked several agency offices in the past two years. When US officials concede that the Pakistan Army is, to borrow a phrase from GHQ, stretched too thin, they are obliquely referring to this theory. Read between the lines: the army is stretched thin, despite having boosted its northwestern ranks to 140,000 troops, because the remainder of the active force continues to man the eastern border.
This theory, however, is less in vogue these days. Thanks to the findings of the Obama administration`s December review of the long war, there is more interest in the Afghanistan theory of Pakistani obstinacy regarding militant sanctuaries.
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Posted on November 4, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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Not content with shaming US diplomats, the Pakistani press this week, under the cover of the WikiLeaks scandal, dragged Indians into the mire too.
News reports, which have since been retracted, cited fake leaked cables in which US diplomats described senior members of India`s military as egotistical, geeky, and even genocidal, while Indian politicians were accused of maintaining ties with Hindu fundamentalists. The propagandistic use of the `leaked cables` occurred at the expense of the local media`s credibility, but in the publication of these false reports lies a vital reminder about Pakistani foreign policy.
Notably, reports about the fake cables were sourced to an Islamabad-based news agency that has been described in the international media as having close links to the Pakistani intelligence services. Writing in the Guardian , Declan Walsh rightly pointed out that the readiness of news organisations to publish the false reports without verifying their content indicates the Pakistan Army`s continued influence over the supposedly free media landscape.
The fact that America`s lowest moment in public diplomacy and international perception can be reoriented as a critique about India in the Pakistani public sphere is telling. The incident reiterates what the WikiLeaks made clear, and what we all already knew even before the document dump: the country`s foreign policy — and the national conversation about it — is being carefully micromanaged by the army.
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Posted on November 4, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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Whatever one thinks of Julian Assange, the principles behind his WikiLeaks website are among those that Pakistani civil society has been advocating for: transparency, government accountability, increased access to information and public participation in the political decision-making process.
best price cialis generic However, barely days after Cablegate, rather than addressing revelations about Pakistani governance and foreign relations, the establishment is doing what it can to suppress the impact of the leaks. It seems as if this diplomatic fiasco is fated to be yet another missed opportunity for Pakistan to evaluate its leadership structure, engage productively with its ambivalent allies and convey its legitimate national interests to the international community.
Although last week`s leaks emphasise the divisiveness between the government, army, opposition and foreign powers, the reaction to WikiLeaks’ revelations has been uniform. The prime minister has dismissed them as mischief, and the US ambassador has described them as malicious. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet neglected to mention the disclosures in its official press release, stating that it had `more important` things to discuss, even though sources have confirmed the matter was addressed on Friday.
Taking it a step further, the defence minister has written off the leaks as an attempt to demoralise the armed forces, while the Sindh home minister has denounced the website`s revelations as lies. The Lahore High Court also received a petition seeking to ban the WikiLeaks website on the basis that it is a conspiracy to cleave the Muslim world.
One would think that the WikiLeaks releases— which document the extent of the civil-military power struggle, reveal our politicians as mere pawns of foreign governments, raise questions about the security of our nuclear programme, and much more — would prompt clarifications and apologies from our leaders. But the official responses thus far betray a worrying instinct to reject and repudiate that which is problematic. Rather than shatter the status quo, the leaks have strengthened it — concerned officials are now scrambling to deny rather than deal with the issues that have been thrown up by the disclosures, thereby exacerbating existing tensions.
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Posted on November 4, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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As Nato and US deadlines for withdrawal from Afghanistan have become clearer, our establishment has put its savvy on fine display. Pakistan has re-articulated its long-held geo-strategic goals in the context of the fight against extremism, thereby ensuring that the international community accommodates the country’s foreign policy priorities.
It now seems that a friendly government in Kabul and pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute are imperatives for Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy. But take a closer look and it becomes apparent that the government has yet to show any real commitment to eliminating extremism.
With regard to close Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in a post-US withdrawal scenario, a counter-terrorism case is easily made: with Kabul’s cooperation, Islamabad can better monitor terrorist activity along the Durand Line and ensure that anti-Pakistan militant groups do not find sanctuary in Afghanistan.
In the event of civil war, an Islamabad that enjoys influence in Kabul would be well positioned to stem the inevitable tide of refugees that would further destabilise Pakistan. Moreover, Islamabad, or Rawalpindi, can check Indian support for Afghanistan-based, anti-Pakistan separatist or militant groups with Kabul’s support.
By making the country’s future stability contingent on its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan has earned the ear of the international community. A recent report issued by the Pentagon calls for balancing Pakistani and Indian interests in Afghanistan. Kashmir, too, has been brought to the forefront of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy. During October’s US-Pakistan strategic dialogue, the foreign minister reiterated the resonance of the Kashmir issue with the Pakistani public. And in recent visits to Washington, retired generals Ehsanul Haq and Pervez Musharraf stated that resolving the dispute is necessary for reducing Pakistani terrorism since ongoing injustices in Kashmir spur militant recruitment.
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Posted on November 3, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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The ongoing fight against militancy along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has been hijacked by charged rhetoric, conspiracy theories and competing interests. Consume enough media, and it begins to seem like the great game that many say it is — a blame game, a game of chance, a guessing game.
But far too frequently one is reminded of the very real consequences and immense human toll of this twisted `game`. Friday`s attacks in Darra Adamkhel and outside Peshawar were the most recent reminders in this vein.
Scores, including children, were killed, in the suicide bombing at the Friday prayers in Akhorwal. A few hours later, three more people died when grenades were flung at another mosque in Badhber.
In light of these horrifying attacks, it is ironic that the big counter-terrorism news of the week was the Obama administration`s announcement of stronger sanctions against the anti-India militant groups Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammad. On Friday, one was left wondering where the Zardari administration`s announcements about crackdowns against anti-Pakistan groups were.The sanctions were carefully timed: in the run-up to US President Barack Obama`s trip to New Delhi, they were meant to reassure India that Washington was not undermining its interests in deference to Pakistan. Given their diplomatic cachet, it is notable that the sanctions target terror financing. The US Treasury has put a freeze on Lashkar and Jaish assets and banned transactions with the groups as well as their operational fronts, such as the Al Rehman Trust. It has also prevented senior militant leaders such as Azam Cheema, Masood Azhar and Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki from using financial institutions. Makki, in particular, has been targeted for his role in raising funds for the Lashkar-i-Taiba.
As a goodwill gesture to India, the US crackdown on terror financing is significant. After all, cut the funding and terrorist activities will inevitably decline. In the world of terror, money is needed not only to secure materials for attacks, but also to travel, pay militants, provide for their families, recruit and train new fighters, propagate the ideology and bribe government officials. As Pakistan`s security situation further deteriorates, Islamabad should make its own call to disrupt the funding mechanisms of all militant groups active within its borders, not only those that plot against India.
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Posted on November 3, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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A few days after this summer’s flooding in Pakistan had gained momentum the phone calls began. The waters from the inundated valleys of the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province were now rushing towards the fertile plains of the Punjab. Foreign correspondents of several international news outlets based in Islamabad wanted to know how the flooding would impact counterterrorism efforts in the region. Would extremist organizations use the floods as an opportunity to infiltrate Pakistan’s rural areas? Would their religious rhetoric help give meaning to the calamity, thereby spurring recruitment among the rural poor?
I fumbled through answers to these questions, all the while transfixed by the disaster movie images on my television screen, and the soaring statistics about the number of people affected. In many exchanges with journalists, both domestic and foreign, I debated the risk posed by extremist groups who might try to exploit feelings of frustration and helplessness that would abound in flood-affected communities. But those discussions were half-hearted and distracted—I was more preoccupied by the humanitarian toll of the flooding than its impact on counterterrorism strategy.best price cialis generic
What those early phone calls made clear, however, was that the narrative about Pakistan’s floods was being hijacked. Instead of being framed as the worst humanitarian disaster on record, which is how U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described it, the flooding was being seen as another complication in the U.S.-led fight against Taliban insurgents and affiliated militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The consequences of this hijacking quickly became apparent. Despite the overwhelming scale of the disaster – 20 million people affected; five million homes damaged; 5,000 miles of roads washed away; 7,000 schools; and 400 health facilities destroyed – the international community proved reluctant to donate funds for flood-affected Pakistanis.
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Posted on November 3, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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It is a well-known fact that America’s relations with Pakistan are double-edged at every level. Washington tries to strengthen the strategic partnership through dialogue, then lets Nato forces in ‘hot pursuit’ of militants cross the Pakistani border; showers aid on the military, yet cuts funding to units suspected of violating human rights; demands that the Pakistan Army target militants in North Waziristan, even while asking our politicians and generals to help negotiate with the Afghan Taliban.
It is not surprising, then, that the US remains double-minded about its policies on how best to engage with the Pakistani people. Although we have been led to believe that every American (at least those on Capitol Hill) is out to win our hearts and minds, there are many who increasingly question the US government’s obsession with making Pakistanis like their country.
The need for such questioning is clear. Washington sees bilateral foreign assistance as a way to sway public opinion and foster stability by earning the trust of elusive hearts and minds. But while the US has given Pakistan over $18bn in military and civilian aid since 2001, only 17 per cent of Pakistanis view the US favourably, according to a Pew Research Centre survey from June. These contradictory statistics suggest that the harder the US tries to improve its image by doling out bucketfuls of aid, the more suspicious of its motives Pakistanis become.
To their credit, some US policymakers are well aware of this conundrum, and are beginning to re-evaluate the logic of expecting aid to buy love (to be clear: US officials are not rethinking giving aid to Pakistan; rather, they are reconsidering their own expectations of what impact assistance will have on the Pakistani public). They argue that it would be more productive to stop worrying about incorrigible Pakistani hearts and minds, and instead focus on strengthening Pakistan’s economy and public institutions for the sake of long-term stability and progress.
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Posted on November 3, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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The third installment of the strategic dialogue between the Pakistan and US governments, which took place in Washington in October, was meant to strengthen the bilateral relationship. Instead, showdowns on counterterrorism strategy further strained relations. The US repeated its demand that the Pakistan Army pursue militants harboring in the northwestern tribal area, North Waziristan—an action the army is reluctant to take for political and strategic reasons.
To incentivize the Pakistan Army, the US offered a $2 billion security assistance package. But this overture, too, was tainted by an announcement during the dialogue that the US would cut funding and training to six Pakistan Army units accused of human rights violations, including torture and extrajudicial killings of suspected militants. Such a sharp rebuke of an ally is unusual, and is expected to heighten tensions in the run up to the 2011 US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Concerns about Pakistan Army transgressions have been brewing since last summer: in August 2009, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that troops had killed 282 suspected militants and their sympathizers in Swat, where the army had conducted operations to root out militancy. The following month, a video posted on Facebook allegedly showed soldiers abusing detainees. The US government was eventually compelled to invoke the Leahy Amendment (1997 legislation that prohibits the US from providing assistance to foreign armies suspected of committing atrocities) when a video captured on a mobile phone surfaced in October this year, showing soldiers in uniform shooting six blindfolded men believed to be suspected militants.
Apologists have linked these instances of battlefield justice to pressures the Pakistan Army is facing owing to US government requests to “do more” in the fight against terrorists along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the practice has as much to do with the lack of an alternative, efficient, and just means by which to ensure that suspected militants are permanently removed from the fighting arena. By any standard, Pakistan’s anti-terrorism courts (ATCs) are ill equipped to deal with the recent influx of apprehended terror suspects.
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Posted on November 3, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
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What began last week as a strategic dialogue between US and Pakistani civilian and military leaders ended in strategic disconnect. Despite the US State Department’s efforts to make Washington’s relationship with Islamabad less one-dimensional – 13 working groups discussed development issues as wide-ranging as water and women’s empowerment – security issues remained the focus of high-level exchanges.
This dialogue aimed to smooth heightened by NATO incursions into Pakistan, and Islamabad’s subsequent . Such meetings were conceived as an opportunity for the allies to communicate openly and frankly, thereby strengthening the partnership. While there was much plain speaking from both sides last week, the two governments now find themselves at cross-purposes, less strategically aligned than before on the security front.
The US last week articulated when it asks its ally to “do more”: crack down on the Haqqani group in North Waziristan, launch operations against Al Qaeda in Balochistan, allow US Special Forces more flexibility within Pakistan to target militants, and halt terror attacks in both India and Afghanistan.
Pakistan, too, made demands in its own interest. They reiterated the call for a , with little or no Indian involvement (the US has begun to acquiesce to this status quo, starting with its help in brokering a transit trade agreement between Islamabad and Kabul, but not New Delhi, this summer). The Pakistani delegation also emphasized the need for Washington to balance its bilateral relations with Islamabad and New Delhi, thus securing a promise from President Barack Obama to visit Pakistan in 2011.
Given these diverging priorities, the question is how the allies will proceed from this point on.
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Posted on November 3, 2011 by Huma Yusuf
This article first appeared in on October 24, 2010.
THREE days, 13 working groups, countless delegates. They came from across Pakistan to Washington to strengthen the bilateral relationship. They came to talk of water, energy, women`s empowerment, and much else. What they really discussed — whether inadvertently, or inevitably — was India.
The headlines have focused on the new security assistance package and joint counter-terrorism efforts. But the week`s strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the US was to some extent hijacked by Islamabad — and Rawalpindi`s — concerns about New Delhi.
Most of these concerns were addressed at an explicit level. On Tuesday before the dialogue kicked off, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, speaking at an event at Harvard University, asked the US to do “everything in its power” to help Pakistan and India resolve the Kashmir dispute. The request was reiterated on Friday, when Qureshi bluntly suggested that US President Barack Obama intervene in the Kashmir issue during his November visit to India (even though the US has defined the territorial dispute as a bilateral issue between Pakistan and India).
During his talk at Harvard, Qureshi also emphasised Pakistan`s continuing desire for a civilian nuclear deal with the US, akin to the one inked between Washington and New Delhi. Not surprisingly, the US entertained little public discussion on this issue, and instead asked the Pakistani delegation for more details about its civilian nuclear development pact with China.
And then there was the touchy topic of Obama paying a visit to Pakistan to balance out his scheduled trip to India. On this point alone did the Pakistanis leave the White House satisfied: on day one of the dialogue, Obama promised to visit Pakistan in 2011, and even extended an invitation to President Zardari for good measure. If the goal of this overture was to quash further talk of how the US might ease discriminatory treatment of Islamabad vis-Ã -vis New Delhi, it didn`t work.
